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The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the drug
distribution system within the country and is responsible for protecting
public health by promoting access to safe and effective medicines. En-
suring safety of the drug supply is clearly important in achieving this
goal, but drug distribution channels in the United States remain insecure.
Gaps within the drug distribution system make it increasingly vulnerable
to bad actors, such as counterfeiters and terrorists.
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Congress intended the Prescription Drug Marketing Act (PDMA) of
1987 to close these gaps, but the PDMA has not fully succeeded. Impor-
tant PDMA provisions that require tracking of drugs throughout the
distribution chain in the form of "pedigrees"' were set to be implemented
as of Dec. 1, 2006, although a recent court order has stayed complete
implementation. However, these PDMA requirements do not apply uni-
formly to all drug distributors in the United States. Moreover, since
paper pedigrees can be forged, the pedigree system might not be suffi-
cient to prevent the introduction of counterfeit drugs into the U.S.
distribution system. Proposed bipartisan legislation in Congress, the Re-
ducing Fraudulent and Imitation Drugs Act of 2006 (abbreviated
hereinafter as "R.F.I.D. Act") addresses some of these concerns, but the
legislation has not yet been enacted and it is unclear whether it will be.
Thus, many loopholes remain in current FDA regulations.
Electronic pedigree ("e-pedigree") technology can alleviate some of
the problems inherent in paper pedigrees. Radio frequency identification
(RFID)2 remains the most promising e-pedigree solution, although some
have argued that use of this technology raises cost and privacy concerns.
These challenges are not insurmountable, however, and RFID offers
many benefits over other technologies in drug tracking. An alternative
technology, barcodes, is immediately available to supplement use of pa-
per pedigrees in drug tracking. Barcodes are an older, reliable
technology, but they have limited uses and are inefficient. Both of these
technologies have a place in drug tracking, and they can be used together
to offer an immediate and comprehensive e-pedigree solution. The FDA
has a strong interest in securing the drug distribution system, and e-
pedigrees are the best way to do this.
This Note argues for immediate enactment of the R.F.I.D. Act or its
equivalent (or alternatively, for Congress to amend the PDMA directly)
to mandate the use of e-pedigrees by all distributors and manufacturers.
This is not an impossible requirement to fulfill given the immediate
availability of e-pedigree technology. The Note also encourages contin-
ued industry movement towards RFID as an e-pedigree solution, as well
as implementation of the R.F.I.D. Act or its equivalent to protect con-
sumer privacy.
Part I of this Note discusses threats facing the U.S. drug supply from
counterfeit drugs. Part II describes how counterfeits are introduced into
U.S. drug supply chains. Part III discusses problems with the PDMA,
I. A pedigree is a statement that records all transactions of the drug all the way back
to the manufacturer. Pedigrees are discussed infra Part IIl.
2. RFID systems transmit information wirelessly, from an RFID tag to an RFID
reader, using radio waves. RFID technology is discussed infra Part IV.
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and introduces the R.F.I.D. Act as a potential solution. Part IV describes
use of RFID to secure the drug supply and current challenges facing its
implementation. Part V discusses current use of barcodes within the
pharmaceutical industry and the potential use of barcodes as a supple-
ment to paper pedigrees.
I. COUNTERFEIT DRUGS POSE THREATS
TO THE U.S. DRUG SUPPLY
The U.S. drug system is highly controlled, but counterfeit drugs still
enter the U.S. supply chain. Counterfeit drugs are defined by statute as
those sold under a trademark or trade name without proper authorization
from the manufacturer They can be made in the United States or abroad.
Drugs are counterfeit if the identity of the source is fraudulently misla-
beled in a way that suggests it is actually the authentic approved product.
Counterfeit drugs that reach patients through regulated supply chains can
create a serious safety threat because they might contain the wrong active
ingredient, dangerous ingredients, no active ingredient, or the correct in-
gredient in sub-potent or super-potent quantities Counterfeit drugs sold in
the United States might also originate from terrorist organizations, and
sales from counterfeit drugs might go to fund terrorist groups.6
3. "The term 'counterfeit drug' means a drug which, or the container or labeling of
which, without authorization, bears the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark,
imprint, or device, or any likeness thereof, of a drug manufacturer, processor, packer, or dis-
tributor other than the person or persons who in fact manufactured, processed, packed, or
distributed such drug and which thereby falsely purports or is represented to be the product of,
or to have been packed or distributed by, such other drug manufacturer, processor, packer, or
distributor." 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(2) (2005). This definition is broad, in part, because it is in-
tended to protect the intellectual property rights of brand drug manufacturers, and not to
simply restrict the sale of dangerous counterfeits. Thus, some drugs fall under this definition
but might not pose health risks. For example, some unauthorized entities might create replicas
of brand name drugs with the correct ingredients in the correct quantities ("copycat drugs"),
and these drugs are still considered counterfeit in the United States if they bear the trademark
or trade name of the authentic branded drug. Though certain types of counterfeit drugs will
pose a greater health risk than others, copycat drugs should still be eliminated from regulated,
legitimate U.S. distribution channels because we cannot be sure which actors are profiting
from the sales of copycat drugs. For example, sales of copycat drugs could go to fund terrorist
groups or other bad actors.
4. Id.
5. See World Health Organization-Counterfeit Medicines, http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/ (last visited Feb. 16. 2007) (counterfeit Procrit contained
bacteria-tainted water, posing a risk of infection in already severely weakened patients); FDA
Counterfeit Drugs Questions & Answers, http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/qa.html
(last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S
TASK FORCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (June 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/documents/ipreport61906.pdf (discussing how individuals used counterfeit drug sales to
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The high retail prices of drugs create attractive opportunities for
criminals to introduce counterfeit drugs into the U.S. drug distribution
system. Profits from counterfeit sales can be large because counterfeit
drugs are cheap to make7 but can be sold at the retail price of the authen-
tic drug. Gross margins on counterfeit drugs are very high, and earnings
from sales of counterfeit drugs are estimated to reach over $75 billion
globally by 2010.8 Expensive drugs are not the only counterfeit targets:
internationally, the most commonly counterfeit drugs are ones that treat
common diseases, like antibiotics.9 Thus, as counterfeiting increases,
both expensive and high-demand drugs are likely targets.
The indictment of Douglas Albers, owner of Albers Medical Dis-
tributors, demonstrates the lucrative nature of counterfeit drug
trafficking. In one of the largest criminal investigations of counterfeit
medicines, the U.S. Department of Justice alleged that Albers' company
conspired to sell $42 million worth of counterfeit drugs,' ° including Lipi-
tor and Neupogen, to which Albers pled guilty in 2006." The Albers case
highlights an important point about the counterfeit drug trade--drugs
with high sales volumes or expensive drugs are attractive targets. Drugs
with high sales, like Lipitor, are particularly susceptible to counterfeiting
or diversion. 2 Common targets also include expensive products intended
finance Hezbollah efforts); see also GRAHAM SATCHWELL, A SICK BUSINESS 51-64 (Stock-
holm Network 2004) (discussing the link between counterfeit drugs and terrorism and
organized crime); GIULIANI PARTNERS LLC, INTERIM ASSESSMENT REPORT To FDA (May 11,
2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04nOll5/04N-Ol 15_emc-
000013-02.pdf; see generally Links Between Intellectual Property Crime and Terrorist Fi-
nancing: Before the H. Comm. on International Relations, 108th Cong. (Jul. 16, 2003)
(testimony of Ronald K. Noble, Secretary General of Interpol), available at http://
www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/speeches/SG20030716.asp.
7. Counterfeit drugs are often very cheap to produce because cheap ingredient substi-
tutes might be used, ingredients might be omitted, and quality controls and Good
Manufacturing Practices are not implemented during manufacture. See World Health Organi-
zation, supra note 5.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 2001-2006 U.S. ATT'Y W. DISTRICT FOR MO. PROGRESS REP. 32, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/mow/progress-report.pdf.
11. News Release, U.S. Att'y W Dist. Mo. Pharmaceutical Distributor Pleads Guilty to
Selling Counterfeit Drugs, Oct. 18, 2006, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/mow/
news2006/albers.ple.htm.
12. Diverted drugs, also known as "gray market" drugs, are authentic drugs that are
sold outside of intended distribution channels. They bear the trademark of the genuine good
with the approval of the trademark- holder, but the trademark holder has not approved these
drugs for sale in the United States. Counterfeit drugs and drug diversion are closely associ-
ated, because parties who trade in diverted drugs often introduce counterfeit drugs into
distribution channels. Drugs may be diverted from their legitimate ends or drugs from a
cheaper market can be diverted to a market where the drug price is higher. See FDA, COUN-
TERFEIT DRUG TASK FORCE INTERIM REP. 9 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter INTERIM REP.]. Even
drugs that are diverted to the United States from overseas sales can be considered a patient
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for extremely sick patients. Counterfeit Procrit, an anti-anemia drug used
in patients severely ill with cancer or AIDS, posed serious risks of under-
dosing to these patients. 13 Counterfeit Epogen, another anti-anemia drug,
caused serious complications for organ transplant recipients and patients
with end-stage kidney disease. 4
American patients should be concerned about risks presented by
counterfeit drugs. These drugs, when introduced into the supply chain,
present a considerable health and safety threat.
II. How ARE COUNTERFEITS INTRODUCED INTO
THE U.S. DRUG SUPPLY?
According to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
the drug distribution system within the United States is supposed to be a
"closed system that involves several players (e.g., manufacturers, whole-
salers, retailers) who move drug products from the point of
manufacturing to the end user who dispenses the drug to the patient."'5 In
theory, outside actors should not be able to infiltrate this closed system
and introduce fake drugs. Yet counterfeit drugs do enter the system, be-
cause the system is not truly secure.
Challenges to policing U.S. borders permit counterfeit drugs to enter
the country, and gaps in U.S. drug distribution routes allow these drugs
to be distributed domestically. The FDA has witnessed an increase in
counterfeiting activities and the introduction of counterfeits into legiti-
mate drug distribution channels. 6 Though counterfeit drugs can be
manufactured within the United States, it is very common for counterfeit
drugs to be manufactured abroad and then imported into the country.17
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and the FDA work together to
risk if the drug is not approved in the U.S. or the labeling is considered inadequate. See United
States v. Rx Depot, Inc. 290 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1243-44 (D. Okla. 2003). Rx Depot sold a
generic Canadian version of antidepressant Serzone to U.S. customers through an internet
pharmacy, which increased the risk of serious adverse events because the insert did not include
descriptive warnings about serious liver damage, did not mention drugs that should be avoided
while taking the generic, and did not convey the same sense of urgency as the U.S. insert.
13. Drug Warning Letter from Ortho Biotech Products to Healthcare Professionals
(June 6, 2002), available at http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/SAFETY/2002/procrit.htm.
14. Bette Hileman, Counterfeit Drugs, CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, Nov. 10,
2003, at 36-43.
15. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, TASK FORCE ON DRUG IMPORTATION, PRE-
SCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION REP. 38 (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter PRESCRIPTION DRUG
IMPORTATION REP.].
16. Randall Lutter, Associate Commissioner, Address at the NACDS/ HDMA RFID
Healthcare Adoption Summit (Nov. 14, 2005).
17. See Kerry Capell, What's in That Pill?, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, June 18, 2001,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content1l_25/b3737153.htm.
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monitor and prevent illegal importation of drugs into the country, includ-
ing the import of counterfeit and diverted drugs, 8 but it seems
impossible to completely stem the influx of counterfeit drugs. There are
355 points of entry into the United States,' 9 including ports and mail fa-
cilities, and the volume of counterfeit drugs arriving at these points of
entry is staggering. ° While the volume of imported drugs has increased
dramatically, FDA and CBP resources to police imports have not.2' Thus,
the safety of the U.S. drug supply is compromised, in part, because of an
insufficient amount of funding allocated to policing imports. Because it is
very difficult to eliminate the influx of counterfeit drugs moving through
U.S. ports of entry, it becomes even more important that these counterfeit
drugs are not circulated through U.S. drug distribution channels.
U.S. drug distribution channels are difficult to monitor. As shown in
Figure 1,22 these distribution routes can be simple or very complicated.
These routes are linear or cyclical depending on whether intermediaries,
such as wholesalers or repackagers, buy the drug before it reaches the re-
tailer. Counterfeit drugs might be introduced at multiple points along these
routes, especially when drugs change hands many times. The presence of
intermediaries increases opportunities to introduce counterfeits. The
Albers case demonstrates that the introduction of counterfeit drugs can
occur during transactions between various distributors and wholesalers.
FIGURE I
DRUG DISTRIBUTION MODELS
1. Manufacturer-- Retailer
Repackager
2. Manufacturer -,.-Wholesaler o-. Retailer
Repackager
3. Manufacturer --.- Wholesaler - .- le etailer
Other Source of Drugs
(e.g., institutional pharmacies,
closed oor pharmacies,
foreign markets)
18. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL, CUSTOMS DIRECTIVE No. 2310-008A, TRADEMARK
AND TRADENAME PROTECTION (April 7, 2000) (discussing the difference between counterfeit
goods and gray market goods and how importation of each type of good is handled by CBP).
19. PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION REP., supra note 15, at 12.
20. Id. at 12. During an unannounced examination by the FDA and CBP in 2003 at
various international mail facilities and airports, the agencies examined imported products and
88% of the drug products were "violative" of U.S. drug laws. Id. at 13.
21. Id. at 32.
22. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.
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Wholesalers, both primary and secondary, play a major role in drug
distribution: manufacturers sell most of their drugs to wholesalers. 2 A
majority of sales from manufacturers are made to primary wholesalers, 24
who then move these drugs into their own warehouses and resell them to
retailers, other wholesalers, or other entities. 5 A few primary wholesalers
dominate this market: AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health, and McKes-
son. 26 Secondary wholesalers also play an important role in drug
distribution (as well as in drug pricing), but secondary wholesaler sales
make up only 5-10% of the $100 billion wholesaler market,27 and the
secondary companies are much smaller. Secondary wholesalers usually
specialize in purchasing and reselling select discounted drug products
and base their business on a rapid turnover of discounted drugs. Secon-
dary wholesalers buy discounted drugs from manufacturers who are
selling these drugs for a short time at a discounted price, perhaps to meet
quarterly sales goals or to reduce inventory overstock.28 Secondary
wholesalers might later sell these drugs to other wholesalers at a markup,
but at prices lower than what the manufacturer then offers.29 In this way,
the secondary wholesaler market performs an arbitrage function.30 Sec-
ondary wholesalers are important players in drug distribution because
they often deal in smaller volumes of drugs, and can readily serve
smaller and independent pharmacies. They can also offer quick turn-
arounds on drug inventories, meet needs for specialized drugs, or focus
on regional or rural areas."
In practice, wholesalers often engage in multiple transactions in a
drug. The cost differential between the price that wholesalers pay for
drugs and the market price (based on the manufacturer's usual list price
and paid by end users like retailers or patients) makes it possible for the
drug to be resold multiple times at a profit, increasing the likelihood that
multiple transactions occur during distribution. Each transaction
23. Approximately 80% of sales from innovator drug companies are made to wholesal-
ers. FDA, FINAL REPORT ON PROFILE OF THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG WHOLESALING INDUSTRY
(Feb. 12, 2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdma/report200l/attachmentg/l .html.
24. FDA, THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKETING ACT REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (June
2001) [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS].
25. Hileman, supra note 14.
26. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 24. The market capitalizations of these 3 primary
wholesalers are 9.27B, 26.76B, and 14.49B, respectively. See Google Finance,
http://www.google.com/finance (last visited Dec. 9, 2006).
27. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 24.
28. Id. at 7.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.
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provides another opportunity for bad actors, like Albers' company, to
introduce counterfeit drugs into the legitimate supply chain.32
Finally, counterfeit drugs enter the United States through personal
importation and Internet pharmacies. These counterfeits can enter regu-
lated distribution channels if wholesalers buy counterfeit goods via the
Internet. 3' Gray market drugs (i.e., genuine drugs that have been licensed
for sale abroad but not in the United States) are often diverted into the
United States, and while these drugs pose less of a safety threat to
Americans than drugs that are manufactured by counterfeiters, traffic in
gray market goods is illegal. Gray market goods present special issues
that are beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, many of the reme-
dies suggested in this paper, such as electronic pedigrees, will also help
reduce the influx of gray market goods into legitimate distribution chan-
nels.
The inherent difficulties in policing the U.S. borders highlight the
need for more secure drug distribution channels within the country. Se-
curing drug distribution routes will limit the possibility that any
counterfeit drugs that enter the country will find their way onto the
shelves of legitimate pharmacies.
III. LEGISLATION TO PREVENT INTRODUCTION OF
COUNTERFEITS INTO THE U.S. DRUG SUPPLY
Congress recognized that the prescription drug distribution system
lacked sufficient safeguards to prevent the introduction and sale of coun-
terfeit drugs, and that a wholesale drug market had developed which
made it very difficult to determine the original source of drugs. 34 Con-
gress attempted to address these health concerns through PDMA
legislation enacted in 1988, which amended several sections of the Fed-
32. See id.
33. This paper focuses on regulated drug distribution channels and does not address
regulation of personal importation or Internet pharmacies. A truly comprehensive approach to
eliminating counterfeit drugs in the United States must address the major issues of illegitimate
Internet pharmacies and personal importation of drugs. FDA issues cyber warning letters to
shady Internet pharmacies, but the United States does not have jurisdiction to enforce these
warnings in certain countries. Foreign governments do not always assist in tracking down
counterfeit operations in their own countries. These rogue operations are fluid, often closing
down quickly and re-opening elsewhere. The notice requirement for seizure of personal im-
ports is also hampering federal enforcement efforts. Enhanced Efforts and Better Agency
Coordination Needed to Address Illegal Importation: Hearing before Subcomm. On Oversight
and Investigations, GAO-06 175T (Dec. 2005) (statement of Richard M. Stana, Director,
Homeland Security and Justice Issues).
34. See H.R. REP. No. 100-76, at 6 (1987).
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eral Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).35 The PDMA is intended to
ensure that drug products purchased by consumers are safe and effective,
and to limit the risk that counterfeit, adulterated, misbranded, subpotent,
or expired drugs are sold to American consumers.36 In 1999, the FDA
published regulations implementing provisions of the PDMA.37 The 1999
regulations were to take effect in 2000, but the FDA received many
objections to key provisions, leading it to stay the effective date of these
provisions repeatedly.1
8
The regulations establish a "pedigree" requirement for prescription
drugs. A drug pedigree is a statement that identifies each prior sale, pur-
chase, or transaction of the drug, for each transaction all the way back to
the manufacturer, including the names and addresses of all parties en-
gaged in the transaction.39 Each person engaged in the wholesale
distribution of a prescription drug in interstate commerce--except an
authorized distributor of record (ADR) for that drug or the manufac-
turer-must supply a pedigree to the person who receives the drug in a
transaction. The regulations define an ADR as a wholesaler that has an
"ongoing relationship" with a manufacturer to distribute that manufac-
turer's drug.40 "Ongoing relationship" is defined to include a written
agreement between manufacturer and wholesaler.'
The FDA delayed these provisions until Dec. 1, 200642 in an effort to
deal with various stakeholders' concerns with the PDMA provisions,
discussed below in Part III.A, and to consider requiring use of certain e-
pedigree technologies, discussed below in Part III.B. As this date was
about to expire, a Federal District Court recently entered a preliminary
injunction prohibiting implementation of some of these regulations at the
behest of secondary wholesalers, discussed below in Part III.A.
A. PDMA Pedigree Requirements Do Not Mandate
Drug Tracking by All Wholesalers
The FDA delayed implementation of the PDMA pedigree provisions,
in part, to deal with concerns of secondary wholesalers. Secondary whole-
salers object to the definition of ADR described in the regulations for a
number of reasons. First, secondary wholesalers claim that manufacturers
35. The FDCA protects public heath and safety in a number of ways, including prohib-
iting commerce of misbranded or adulterated drug products. See 21 U.S.C. § 331.
36. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 24, at 2.
37. 21 C.ER. § 203 (2006).
38. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 24, at II-III.
39. 21 C.ER. § 203.50 (2006).
40. 21 C.ER. § 203.3(b) (2006).
41. 21 C.FR. § 203.3(u) (2006).
42. Prescription Drug Marketing Act Policies Delay of Effective Date, 69 Fed. Reg.
12,792 (Mar. 18, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.ER. pt. 203).
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are unwilling to enter into written agreements with them; thus, they can-
not be considered an ADR and would have to provide pedigrees.43 In
effect, the PDMA gives manufacturers the control in deciding which
wholesalers can be considered ADRs. Second, secondary wholesalers
insist that they will not be able to provide pedigrees showing all prior
sales, because a large portion of their drugs are purchased from ADRs
who are not required to provide pedigrees and will not voluntarily pro-
vide them." Third, secondary wholesalers believe pedigree requirements
will be financially burdensome and will eat into their already narrow
profit margins. 45 A pedigree exemption for ADRs would thus put non-
ADR wholesalers at a disadvantage, both financially and in terms of ob-
taining complete pedigrees as required by the PDMA.
The pedigree exemption for an ADR would erase the chain of cus-
tody on a pedigree each time the drug passes through an ADR's hands
during distribution because ADRs are not required to provide pedigrees.
Since most of the drugs moving through the distribution channel today
pass through an ADR at least once,46 the ADR exemption creates gaps in
the distribution history of drugs.47 Bad actors could exploit such a gap by
selling counterfeit drugs to ADRs because ADRs do not request pedi-
grees before a sale and do not need to pass on pedigrees to their
purchasers. Broadening and relaxing the definition of ADR to include
more secondary wholesalers might help more wholesalers stay in busi-
ness (which is desirable since secondary wholesalers play an important
role in distribution and reduced drug pricing as discussed supra Part II),
but will reduce the extent to which pedigrees are maintained and passed
43. Usually primary wholesalers are considered ADRs because they have ongoing rela-
tionships with the drug manufacturers that have been codified in writing, as PDMA requires.
This Note uses ADR and primary wholesalers interchangeably.
44. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 24, at 9.
45. "[P]rice and competitive conditions dictate that [wholesalers] operate on narrow
profit margins. In general, the wholesale markup is modest ... for every dollar of prescription
drugs sold in 1997, 76 cents went to the manufacturer, 20 cents went to the dispenser (i.e.,
pharmacy), and 4 cents went to the wholesale distributor ... The [National Wholesale Dis-
tributors Association] reported that the after-tax net profit expressed as a percent of sales, was
only 0.62 percent for 1998 ... [Riegional wholesalers ... are at least an order of magnitude
smaller than [primary wholesalers, and] generate revenues of approximately $500 million to
$900 million per year." EASTERN RESEARCH GROUP INC., PROFILE OF THE PRESCRIPTION
DRUG WHOLESALING INDUSTRY, FINAL REPORT 1-12, 1-13 (2001), reprinted in REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 24, at Attachment G.
46. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 24, at IX.
47. When Congress passed the PDMA, they envisioned a linear drug distribution chain
where an ADR would buy drugs directly from the manufacturer. In reality, as discussed supra
Part II, drug distribution can be cyclical, and ADR can buy drugs from wholesalers as well as
manufacturers. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 24, at VIII.
48. Id. at X. Though it is not clear whether this has happened or will happen, counter-
feiting is a real threat to the U.S. drug supply and a comprehensive approach to securing the
distribution system includes acknowledging and addressing potential gaps.
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on in distribution channels (conflicting with Congress' goal of thor-
oughly tracking drug movement). In November 2006, after weighing
these conflicting considerations, the FDA decided to implement the
PDMA pedigree provisions for all prescription drugs,4 9 over the objec-
tions of secondary wholesalers.
The FDA issued a non-binding guidance in November 2006 in an ef-
fort to address these concerns of secondary wholesalers, 0 but it is
unlikely this guidance will help secondary wholesalers. In the guidance,
the FDA strongly recommends that all parties in the distribution chain,
including ADRs, maintain and pass on pedigrees. Since the PDMA only
gives the FDA authority to enforce pedigree requirements against non-
ADRs, the FDA cannot enforce this recommendation against ADRs. It
remains to be seen whether ADRs will comply with these recommenda-
tions all the same, but it seems unlikely. By not complying, an ADR can
effectively drive secondary wholesalers out of business, or at the very
least, reduce profits of secondary wholesalers by reducing the number
and types of sales they can make. Compliance is costly, and it is unlikely
that ADRs will comply with merely hortatory recommendations out of
beneficence. In fact, one major primary wholesaler, AmerisourceBergen,
offers a pedigree service where, for $5,000 or more, the company will
offer pedigrees to secondary wholesalers.' AmerisourceBergen claims
this fee will help the company recover its cost of providing the pedigrees
and is not a money-making scheme, but very few secondary wholesalers
have participated. In all likelihood, most secondary wholesalers will not
be able to afford to pay such high fees to primary wholesalers.
Though the FDA decided to fully implement these pedigree provi-
sions as of December 1, 2006, the Agency has recently faced a major
setback, making the future of the PDMA pedigree provisions uncertain.
In September 2006, secondary wholesalers fought back against the dis-
criminatory treatment under the PDMA by filing suit against HHS.52 The
secondary wholesalers claimed that the pedigree provisions violate the
Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the U.S. Constitution,53 and
sought an injunction against the FDA to delay their implementation. On
49. Prescription Drug Marketing Act Pedigree Requirements, 71 Fed. Reg. 66,448
(Nov. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.FR. pt. 203 and 205).
50. OFFICE OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, PRESCRIPTION DRUG
MARKETING ACT (PDMA) REQUIREMENTS 6 (2006).
51. Press Release, IMDA Update, Pedigree Issue Dog Distributors (Oct. 2006),
http://www.imda.org/news/update/200610.htm (last visited Dec. 8, 2006); See Press Release,
AmerisourceBergen Announces Innovative Track and Trace Program for the Pharmaceutical
Supply Channel, http://www.amerisourcebergen.com (last visited Dec. 8, 2006).
52. The FDA is an agency within Health and Human Services (HHS).
53. RxUSA Wholesale, Inc. v. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., No. 06-CV-5086 (JS)
(AKT) (E.D.N.Y Dec. 8,2006).
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December 8, 2006, a federal district court judge in the Eastern District of
New York issued a preliminary injunction effectively staying implemen-
tation of the pedigree provisions. The FDA recognizes that limiting the
injunction to the plaintiffs or to the EDNY would be confusing and un-
fair,5 so it appears that the FDA will apply the terms of the injunction
uniformly to all non-ADR wholesalers. Both the FDA and RxUSA have
made clear that they will continue to litigate this issue,56 but for the mo-
ment, the Agency's attempts to enforce inconsistent pedigree provisions
upon the industry have been thwarted. The decision was a major blow to
the Agency's reliance upon the PDMA to secure drug tracking, leaving
drug tracking status quo and the drug supply vulnerable.
Uniform pedigree requirements are necessary to ensure comprehen-
sive safety of the U.S. drug supply. To achieve this goal, Congress and
the FDA should enact legislation to require pedigrees by all wholesalers
and manufacturers. It remains to be seen how the secondary wholesaler
litigation plays into this scenario, but hopefully the injunction will accel-
erate Congressional interest in making legislative changes to impose
uniform pedigree requirements. An outcome favorable to the secondary
wholesaler plaintiffs will almost certainly spur legislative changes,
whereas the opposite outcome could drive secondary wholesalers out of
business.
B. The PDMA Does Not Mandate E-Pedigrees
Though uniform paper pedigree requirements can help secure drug
distribution chains, these pedigrees are only a partial solution. The FDA
stayed PDMA pedigree provisions, in part, to consider alternatives to
paper pedigrees. 7 Under the PDMA, however, the FDA does not have
54. RxUSA Wholesale, Inc. v. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., No. 06-CV-5086 (JS)
(AKT) (E.D.N.Y Dec. 8, 2006), Order Adopting Report and Recommendation, filed Dec. 11,
2006; Heather Won Tesoriero, Federal Injunction Will Delay Part of Drug-Tracking Law,
WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE, Dec 4., 2006, http://online.wsj.com (last visited Feb. 15,
2007). Specifically, the decision enjoins provision 21 C.F.R. § 203.50(a) and its subparts. This
provision requires non-ADR wholesalers to pass on pedigrees documenting each prior transac-
tion of the drug, including the lot number of the drug and other identifying information. 21
C.F.R. § 203.50(a) (2004). FDA claims, however, that other subparts of Section 203 and its
related guidance documents still require wholesalers to maintain pedigree statements showing
prior transactions up to the last ADR. FDA, ADDENDUM TO FDA's GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
PDMA PEDIGREE REQUIREMENTS-QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELATED TO THE PRELIMI-
NARY INJUNCTION ORDERED 12/5/06 IN RXUSA WHOLESALERS, INC. v. HHS (Dec. 15, 2006)
[hereinafter ADDENDUM]. Based on the statutory language within § 203, however, this claim
seems weak.
55. ADDENDUM, supra note 54, at 3.
56. Backgrounder re: RxUSA Wholesalers, Inc. v. HHS (Dec. 18, 2006),
http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/PDMA/PDMA backgrounder.pdf; RxUSA Pro Consumer
Litigation Files and Information, http://www.rxusa.com/litigation/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
57. Lutter, supra note 16.
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the authority to compel use of electronic pedigrees ("e-pedigrees"). As a
result, various states have adopted their own legislation requiring use of
e-pedigrees" to improve security in statewide drug distribution and to
reduce inefficiencies associated with paper tracking, but most states do
not have e-pedigree legislation in place.
Until very recently, the FDA had been pressuring stakeholders ag-
gressively to adopt electronic pedigrees, particularly RFID technology,
by 2007.' 9 In November 2006, the FDA acknowledged that industry-wide
adoption of RFID would be unfeasible by its previously announced goal
of 2007.6° The FDA acknowledged in its November 2006 guidance letter
that e-pedigrees could be used as an alternative or supplement to paper
pedigrees, but the Agency refused to back any particular e-pedigree
technology, noting instead that a variety of technologies were available,
including barcodes. Though the FDA withdrew some of its pressure upon
stakeholders to adopt RFID, RFID remains the most promising e-
pedigree solution within the pharmaceutical industry. Despite the FDA's
recent hedging about which e-pedigree technology is best, some phar-
maceutical companies have already invested in and implemented
programs to use RFID to track highly counterfeit drugs,6' and some pri-
mary wholesalers have done the same.62 It seems that many of these
industry players recognize current deficiencies in paper tracking and are
gradually moving toward alternative solutions.
Since paper pedigrees alone are insufficient to deter introduction of
counterfeit drugs, e-pedigrees should be utilized as a replacement or
supplement to paper pedigrees. Congress could require the use of e-
pedigrees, in order to improve drug tracking, by revising the PDMA.
Alternatively, Congress could enact the R.F.I.D. Act, discussed in the
next section, which mandates e-pedigrees.
58. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4034 (2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-26-14
(2006).
59. FDA, COMBATING COUNTERFEIT DRUGS REPORT, February 18, 2004, at H, available
at http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeitlreportO2_O4.html [hereinafter COUNTERFEIT
DRUGS REPORT].
60. 71 Fed. Reg. 66448 (Nov. 15, 2006).
61. Susannah Patton, Cracks in the Pharmaceutical Supply Chain, CIO MAG., Jan. 15,
2006, available at http://www.cio.com/archive/Ol1506/pharma.html (discussing RFID pilot
programs by Purdue Pharma, Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline); Jonathan Collins, Novartis Trial
Shows RFID Can Boost Patient Compliance, RFID J., June 20, 2006, available at
http://www.rfidjoural.com/article/articleview/2438/.
62. Claire Swedberg, AmerisourceBergen to Conduct HF/UHF RFID Pilot, RFID J.,
Nov. 14, 2006, available at http://www.rfidjoumal.conrarticle/articleview/2820/; Press Re-
lease, Cardinal Health, Cardinal Health Announces Next Phase of RFID Pilot (May 9, 2006),
available at http://www.cardinal.com/content/news/59200613 829.asp.
Spring 2007]
590 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 13:577
C. Solutions Within the Reducing Fraudulent and
Imitation Drugs Act of 2006
Current bills in Congress, if enacted, would address inconsistent
pedigree requirements, problems with paper pedigrees, and overall, help
secure the safety of the U.S. drug supply. In 2006, Representative Dan
Burton (R-IN) and Senator David Vitter (R-LA) introduced the Reducing
Fraudulent and Imitation Drugs Act of 2006 in the House and Senate,
respectively. 6 Both bills have been referred to subcommittees, 4 but nei-
ther has yet passed. This Act, which has bipartisan support, gives HHS
the authority to require pedigree tracking by all manufacturers and dis-
tributors of prescription drugs. ADRs would no longer be exempt from
the pedigree requirement. Furthermore, the Act recognizes the need for a
federal mandate to bring about national e-pedigree compliance. The pro-
posed legislation establishes e-pedigree requirements, and states that
"radio frequency identification (RFID) tagging technology, or similar
trace and track technologies that have an equivalent function" are re-
quired for all prescription drug packaging to authenticate the pedigrees
65
of these drugs.
The R.F.I.D. Act goes beyond the PDMA to require a more multi-
layered approach to securing drug distribution. The Act requires that the
drug's packaging incorporate "tamper-indicating technologies."66 With-
out tamper-evident packaging, the original container could be reused for
counterfeit drugs and could be more easily passed off as genuine prod-
uct. 67 The Act also requires use of "blister security packaging when
possible."68 A blister pack is a pack consisting of indentations (blisters)
into which a pill is placed, before being sealed with a plastic covering. A
blister pack might be safer than pill bottles because removal of pills is
more obvious from a blister pack than from a pill bottle, and it might be
more expensive to make counterfeit blister packs than it is to put coun-
terfeit pills in bottles.69 The Act also recommends incorporating overt
and covert technologies into drug packaging. ° Overt technologies, such
63. Reducing Fraudulent and Imitation Drugs Act of 2006, H.R. 4829, 109th Cong.
(2006); S. 2668, 109th Cong. (2006).
64. In March 2006, H.R. 4829 was referred to the Subcommittee on Health, and in
April 2006, S. 2668 was referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions,
where they remain currently. See Bill Summary & Status, http://thomas.loc.gov/ (follow
"Bills, Resolutions" hyperlink; follow "Search Bill and Summary & Status" hyperlink; search
for bill numbers) (last visited Dec. 8, 2006).
65. H.R. 4829 § 2(a)(1).
66. Id. at § 2(a)(2).
67. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 12, at 13.
68. H.R. 4829 § 2(a)(3).
69. COUNTERFEIT DRUGS REPORT, supra note 59.
70. H.R. 4829 § 2(c).
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as colors or holograms, are visible to the eye, and covert technologies,
such as invisible bar codes, chemical markers, and fluorescent inks, are
not visible to the eye and require special equipment to read.7' Under a
multi-layered approach, counterfeiters must overcome multiple techno-
logical barriers, which might prove impossible or, at the very least,
expensive.
The R.F.I.D. Act also recommends phased-in implementation of e-
pedigree requirements. Congress intends for these provisions to apply
first to drugs that are most commonly counterfeit beginning December
31, 2007 at the latest, and finally to all prescription drugs no later than
December 31, 2010.72 Phased-in implementation helps address some of
the challenges still facing widespread RFID deployment, discussed infra
Part IV.
The R.F.I.D. Act offers a more comprehensive solution to the coun-
terfeit drug problem in wholesale distribution than does the PDMA. It is
imperative that Congress enact the R.F.I.D. Act, or its equivalent, to give
the FDA authority to require e-pedigrees by all distributors and to en-
courage a multi-layered approach to combating drug counterfeiting.
Parts IV and V discuss e-pedigree technology that is currently available.
IV. RFID E-PEDIGREES
Legislation mandating e-pedigrees might stall in Congress if stake-
holders object that the available e-pedigree technology cannot be
feasibly deployed. Certainly, available e-pedigree technology must be
sufficiently developed if Congress intends to mandate its use throughout
the pharmaceutical industry. RFID deployment throughout the industry
currently faces cost and privacy challenges. These challenges are not
insurmountable, however, and the R.F.I.D. Act's goal of widespread
RFID adoption for all prescription drugs by 2010 is attainable.
RFID can serve as a complete replacement to paper pedigrees. RFID
systems consist of three components: a tag, a reader, and a database.73
The tag consists of a tiny silicon chip and antenna. Mobile or stationary
readers scan the tag using radio frequency ("RF") waves and the infor-
mation is then stored in a central database.4 The RFID tag can be
encoded with a unique serial number, also known as an electronic prod-
71. PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION REP., supra note 15, at 47.
72. To determine which drugs are most commonly counterfeit, the Act requires HHS to
publish in the Federal Register a list of no less than 30 prescription drugs that are frequent
counterfeit targets, and to annually update the list. H.R. 4829 § 2(f)(1).
73. FED. TRADE COMM'N, RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION: APPLICATIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 3 (2005).
74. Id. at 1.
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uct code ("EPC"). The RFID tag can be affixed to a pharmaceutical
package (on the bottle or package itself, or on a bottle seal75) and as the
package moves through the distribution chain, distributors can use RFID
readers to scan the EPC on the package and generate a record of the
drug's movement (an e-pedigree). Since certain types of RFID tags can
have new information "written" upon them, the pedigree of the drug can
be updated every time the drug changes hands by those having access to
the RFID database. Paper tracking becomes unnecessary. RFID tags are
most effective in preventing introduction of counterfeit drugs when used
on an individual drug package instead of placed on a case of drug pack-
ages; that way even if the case of drugs is subdivided and sold by
distributors, each drug unit can be individually tracked. RFID is also
highly efficient; multiple RFID tags can be read instantly by a strategi-
cally placed reader, without the need for humans to scan products.76 In
this manner, large inventories of RFID tagged drugs can be read and au-
thenticated rapidly.
RFID use in pharmaceutical tracking is relatively new, however the
technology has already been put to use in other industries. Many gov-
ernment agencies and private companies are using RFID tags. RFID is
used in EZ-Pass toll payment 7 and the Department of Defense uses tags
to track supply chain and military items all over the world.78 The De-
partment of Homeland Security has issued final rules on implementation
of RFID chips in passports7 9 and diplomats have already been issued
such passports. 80 The Federal Aviation Administration has conducted
studies on RFID interference with flight communications," the U.S.
Postal Service has begun implementing RFID in tracking certain ship-
ments,82 and the USDA plans to use RFID in tracking animals.83 Major
75. Pharmaceutical Online, Tagsys RF1D Technology to be Used In Helping Combat
Drug Counterfeiting, Apr. 11, 2005, http://www.pharmaceuticalonline.com/Content/ (discuss-
ing collaboration to develop RFID tagged packaging seals between major pharmaceutical
packager and RFID hardware provider).
76. Lori Chordas, Tag, You're It, BEST'S REVIEW 50 (June 2006).
77. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 73, at 5.
78. See Mark Roberti, DOD Releases Final RFID Policy, RFID J., Aug. 9, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleview/l080/l/14/.
79. 22 C.FR. § 51 (2006).
80. U.S. Government Issues 300 RFID Passports, RFID UPDATE, Mar. 14, 2006, avail-
able at http://www.rfidupdate.com/articles/index.php?id=1073.
81. Anthony Cerino & William Walsh, Research and Application of RFID Technology
to Enhance Aviation Security, PRoc. OF THE IEEE 2000 NAT'L AEROSPACE AND ELECS. CONF.
127 (2007).
82. See Laurie Sullivan, Global Mail Services Seen as New Frontier for RFID, INFOR-
MATION WEEK, Nov. 10, 2005, http://informationweek.constory/showArticle.jhtml?
articlelD= 173601751 &tid=5978.
83. See Marsha Walton, USDA Steps Up Efforts to Track Livestock, CNN.COM, May
28, 2004, http://edition.cnn.comV2004/TECH/science/05/24/animalidentificationl.
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retailers like Marks & Spencer and Wal-Mart already use RFID in inven-
tory and supply-chain management. '
In addition to use as an e-pedigree, RFID has broader applications
within pharmaceutical distribution. RFID tags with batteries can measure
environmental conditions and confirm that transported drugs have been
held at the appropriate temperature and humidity conditions, which is
important to a drug's safety and efficacy. RFID can also be used to track
drug shipments internationally and prevent international drug diversion. s5
RFID-tagged drugs can also be identified in the event of a manufacturer
recall, so that only specific lots of drugs that were contaminated could be
identified and recalled.86 RFID-tagged drugs can be read by Customs and
Border Patrol enforcement at ports of entry, potentially reducing illegal
reimportation or diversion of drugs into the United States.
If RFID has significant advantages over paper pedigrees and offers
added benefits as well, why is it not widely used by all manufacturers
and wholesalers to track drugs during distribution? Cost and privacy
concerns are barriers to immediate widespread adoption of RFID as an
e-pedigree solution for all drugs. As discussed in Part IV.A, as RFID
costs decrease over time, stakeholders can eventually deploy RFID as an
e-pedigree for all drugs. This is desirable since RFID systems offer a
complete pedigree solution and other benefits to pharmaceutical distribu-
tion. But before item-level RFID drug tagging can occur, Congress and
the FDA must address privacy concerns by swiftly enacting and imple-
menting the R.F.I.D. Act, or its equivalent, as discussed in Part IV.B.
A. Cost
Costs associated with RFID use are a major concern throughout the
industry.87 Even for major companies, the costs of implementing enter-
prise-wide RFID systems are not trivial. Some analysts predict that
"typical, large-scale manufacturers in the consumer goods industry will
84. See Background to Marks & Spencer's Business Trial of RFID in its Clothing Sup-
ply Chain, http://www2.marksandspencer.com/thecompany/mediacentre/pressreleases/
2005/com2005-02-18-00.shtrl (last visited Dec. 2, 2005); Jonathan Birchall, WalMart Tough-
ens Push on Wireless Tagging, MSNBC.COM, Dec. 20, 2005, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/
10536693/.
85. See Cristen Bolan, Is RFID's Tag Too Pricey?, GLOBAL COSMETIC INDUSTRY 28
(Jan. 2005) (discussing use of e-seals to track products over long international routes).
86. Chordas, supra note 76.
87. See Todd Zwillich, Breaking News in Depth: FDA Relaxing Packaging Rules to
Ease RFID Use, DRUG Topics, Dec. 13, 2004, http://www.drugtopics.condrugtopics/article/
articleDetail.jsp?id=137453&&pagelD=2 (last visited Mar. 9, 2007); Burt Moore, Hidden
Costs of Implementing RFID, MATERIAL HANDLING MANAGEMENT 62 (Nov. 2004).
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spend from $9 million to $25 million" to become RFID-compliant,88 but
that number could be larger for pharmaceutical companies to tag their
product lines. A Pfizer RFID pilot for Viagra cost several million dollars
to tag retail packages and cases of the drug. 9 Presumably costs will be
far greater to tag unit packages. Costs vary for each part of the RFID
system. The price for RFID tags have been quoted from anywhere be-
tween 20 cents per tage to 20 dollars or more.9' Reader costs vary based
on frequency and can range from a few hundred to a few thousand dol-
lars.92 Installation, connectivity, and database management costs vary
based on a number of factors, but can run from thousands to millions of
dollars.
Though initial roll-out costs might be high, companies are seeking
better returns on investment in these REID expenditures. RFID can save
a pharmaceutical company billions of dollars in long-term management
and inventory control costs. 93 Counterfeit drug sales represent lost profits
that a drug company can prevent through use of RFID. Pharmaceutical
companies can also recover these initial cost expenditures through the
value RFID tracking returns in production planning and marketing,
through sales and distribution data based on region or retailer.
To date, however, most pharmaceutical companies have rolled out
RFID pilot programs only for their most highly counterfeit drugs, and
not all of their product lines.94 At present, it may not be feasible to use
RFID enterprise-wide: RFID may only be justifiable for products that
represent a high value in lost profits and products that have a higher re-
tail price.95 Similarly, generic prescription drug makers might find the
costs of rolling out RFID harder to justify because the profit margins on
generic drug sales are much lower than those on brand-name drug
88. Larry Shutzberg, Scoping Out the Real Costs of RFID, INFORMATION WEEK, Nov.
1, 2004, available at http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=
51201525.
89. Pfizer News Release, http://www.pfizer.comlpfizer/are/news-releases/2004pr/nm-
2004_1115.jsp (Nov. 15, 2004).
90. RFID Journal, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.rfidjournal.comfaq/20 (last
visited Mar. 8, 2007).
91. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 73, at 6.
92. RFID Journal, supra note 90.
93. Estimates project cost savings of $2 billion worldwide for pharmaceuticals through
RFID use due to improved inventory management. Chris Paddison, Busting the Myths of
Pharna RFID, ATKEARNEY EXECUTIVE AGENDA, vol. VIII, no. 2, 40, 41-42 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.atkearney.sk/shared-res/pdf/Busting-the Myths ofPharmaRFID.pdf.
94. Zwillich, supra note 87 (discussing Pfizer, Purdue Pharma, and GlaxoSmithKline's
RFID tagging pilots for highly counterfeit products, including Viagra, OxyContin, and anti-
HIV drugs).
95. Bolan, supra note 85, at 24-25 (discussing an IBM business study concluding that
manufacturers can see a return on investment by RFID tagging "high value goods that are
often stolen or counterfeit.")
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sales.96 However, as demand for RFID increases, perhaps spurred by e-
pedigree federal mandates,97 RFID production will increase and associ-
ated costs will drop.9
As drug manufacturers move towards using RFID to track all of their
products, all wholesalers will eventually have to pass on pedigrees using
RFID. Secondary wholesalers, who operate on narrow profit margins,
might find RFID costs prohibitive. However, secondary wholesalers do
not need to implement full RFID systems to track drugs. The costs that
secondary wholesalers will incur include the costs of readers, and the
costs of verifying authenticity of the EPC by connecting (often via se-
cure means online)99 to the RFID database. Subscription fees for this
connection can be high, but they appear to vary based on the dollar sales
of the subscribing company.'°° Subscription costs might be substantially
lower for small secondary wholesalers and reader costs might be as low
as a few hundred dollars, but the exact costs incurred by secondary
wholesalers for partial RFID adoption are unknown.
Cost remains a barrier to immediate implementation of RFID as an
e-pedigree solution for all prescription drug products, but RFID costs
will drop as use increases. Pharmaceutical companies can justify RFID
costs because the technology offers companies a positive return on in-
vestment and meaningful benefits. Additionally, RFID use might not
drive secondary wholesalers out of business. Federal e-pedigree legisla-
tion, like the R.F.I.D. Act, will encourage pharmaceutical companies to
gradually utilize RFID for all of their drug products, increase RFID use
throughout the industry, and drive down hardware costs.
96. See id. at 25-27 (discussing IBM business study concluding that companies who
sell high volumes of low priced goods will not realize a return on investment for RFID at
present.)
97. David Hannon, What You Need to Know About RFID for Inbound Logistics, PUR-
CHASING, VOL. 134, no. 4, Mar. 3, 2005, at 46 (discussing the link between mandates, increased
adoption, and cheaper technology).
98. Charles J. Murray, RFID: Beyond the Drive for Five, DESIGN NEWS, Apr. 24, 2006
(discussing that RFID technologies will become widespread when RFID production volume
reaches a "tipping point" and drives down costs low enough so that it becomes feasible to use
RFID for everyday items), available at http://www.designnews.corm/article/CA6324161.html?
industryid=22204.
99. See, e.g., SupplyScape, Nation's First Authentication Service, http://www.
supplyscape.com/spotlight/2005_authentication.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
100. Shutzberg, supra note 88.
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B. Privacy
Consumer privacy groups, including CASPIAN'0 ' and EPIC,' ° as
well government agencies, have raised a number of privacy issues in
response to growing RFID use. RFID-tagging at a pill or bottle level
could reveal information about a consumer's whereabouts, tastes, pur-
chases, and medical information. A variety of solutions have been
proposed to deal with potential privacy threats.'4 One solution would be
to disable RFID tags in the pharmacy so that the tag stops tracking, and
drug and patient cannot be linked by anyone having access to the associ-
ated RFID database. This is known as "killing" the tag, and can be
accomplished when a reader gives the tag a "kill" command, usually
upon purchase of the tagged object, deactivating it permanently.'05 The
FDA believes that, for privacy reasons, it is not necessary for a tag to
remain active once the drug is sold to a consumer' °6 though this limits the
benefits of RFID in product recalls if the drug has already been sold by
the pharmacy. Another approach to protecting privacy is use of blocker
tags that contain a "privacy bit" which prohibits unauthorized scan-
ning.0 7 So far, agency regulations have failed to address privacy issues in
RFID drug tracking.
If enacted, the R.F.I.D. Act would offer the FDA a way to address e-
pedigree privacy issues in rulemaking. Specifically, the Act prohibits e-
pedigree technologies from "containing or transmitting any information
that may be used to identify a health care practitioner or the prescription
drug consumer.'"" Enforcement of this provision would help allay pri-
vacy concerns. The Act would still allow RFID use, but RFID tags might
101. Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering (CASPIAN)
began a website opposing use of RFID chips. See, RFID Nineteen Eighty-Four,
http://www.spychips.com/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2007).
102. Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) has a website devoted to RFID pri-
vacy issues. See, EPIC RFID Systems, http://www.epic.org/privacy/rfid/ (last visited Mar. 4,
2007).
103. See, eg., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-551, INFORMATION SECU-
RITY RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 18
(May 2005).
104. See, e.g., Hyangjin Kim & Jeeyon Kim, Privacy Threats and Issues in Mobile
RFID, 2006 IEEE PROC. OF FIRST INT'L CONF. ON AVAILABILITY, RELIABILITY, AND SECU-
RITY (discussing sleeping, killing, blocking, passwords, and encryption to address RFID
privacy threats); Zhang et al., An Improved Approach to Security and Privacy of RFID Appli-
cation System, IEEE 1149-52 (2005) (discussing read access control solutions and ways to
prevent eavesdropping and interception of RFID messages).
105. Kim, supra note 104.
106. FDA, COUNTERFEIT DRUG TASK FORCE 2006 UPDATE 20 (June 2006).
107. Zhang et al., supra note 104.
108. H.R. 4829, 109th Cong. at §2(b)(2) (2006).
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need to be killed or blocked when a consumer purchases the drug in the
pharmacy to protect the consumer's privacy.
RFID remains one of the most promising technologies for securing
drug distribution channels in the United States, and cost and privacy
concerns should not prevent eventual adoption of this technology in e-
pedigrees. Many pharmaceutical manufacturers and some wholesalers
are moving towards RFID tracking, and in the long term, costs are likely
to come down. Eventually, item level tagging of all prescription drugs
could be justifiable by all generic and brand drug manufacturers. Fur-
thermore, RFID systems do not necessarily have to compromise patient
privacy.
V. BARCODES ARE AN E-PEDIGREE ALTERNATIVE
Though RFID offers a complete alternative to paper pedigrees, and
has added advantages as well, RFID is not the only available e-pedigree
option. The FDA has also suggested barcodes as an e-pedigree solu-
tion.'" It is worth examining whether barcodes are a viable option. A
barcode is "a way to encode data using a series of bars and spaces.""'
Barcodes are most commonly available in 1-dimensional (1D) and 2-
dimensional (2D) formats. 2D barcodes have the capacity to store more
information."' Information about the drug can be stored on a barcode;
for example, the manufacturer, drug name, and lot number. When drugs
change hands, the buyer can use a barcode reader to authenticate the
original source of the drug. Barcodes, however, are read-only and cannot
be written upon. Each time a drug changes hands, the barcode cannot be
updated with information to indicate that the drug has been sold to a new
wholesaler. In this way, barcodes do not track the chain of custody of a
drug. Thus, ID or 2D barcodes cannot replace paper pedigrees entirely,
and can only be used as a supplement to the paper pedigree system. Fur-
thermore, barcodes are inefficient compared to RFID: they require "line
of sight" to be read, large numbers of barcoded packages cannot be read
instantly, and human intervention is still required to read barcoded pack-
ages."' But barcodes have been in use for a long time and are reliable.
Barcodes are inexpensive, many industries already use barcodes, and
109. 71 Fed. Reg. 66448 (Nov. 15, 2006).
110. Fotel Inc. General Barcode Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.fotel.com/
resources/faqs/barcode.htm#Q005 (last visited Dec. 9, 2006).
111. Clyde E. Witt, Playing Well Together: Bar Code & RFID, 60 MATERIAL HANDLING
MGMT. 12, 13 (2005).
112. See Charles J. Murray, RFID: Beyond the Drive for Five, 61 DESIGN NEWS 48, 48-
50 (2006); Chordas, supra note 76, at 48.
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transitioning a company to barcode systems should be less expensive
than adoption of RFID.
Also, barcodes are already federally mandated for uses within the
pharmaceutical industry, and are thus well-positioned to be used as a
partial e-pedigree solution. In 2004, the FDA issued regulations requir-
ing use of bar code labeling on the internal package and external
packaging of most prescription drugs."3 The bar code must, at minimum,
include the National Drug Code number for the drug." 4 The regulations,
which were made effective in April 2006, are intended to reduce admini-
stration errors in a hospital setting by allowing hospital staff to scan the
barcode and verify that the correct drug is being administered, and the
regulations apply only to drugs that may end up in hospital settings.
Since manufacturers make most of their drug sales to wholesalers, and
these wholesalers sell drugs to hospitals as well as other distributors and
retailers, the bar code requirements will likely apply to the majority of a
manufacturer's prescription drugs. Interestingly, the FDA does not allow
use of any other identification technology in lieu of a barcode for this
regulation, though they do allow manufacturers to encode any additional
information upon the barcode."' This regulation opens the door to use of
barcodes as a supplement to paper pedigrees. Drug manufacturers will
now need to barcode individual drug units, and wholesalers and retailers
can read these barcodes to verify the identity and other information
about the drug. The chain of custody will still need to be updated on pa-
per in order to provide a complete pedigree with each transaction;
however, item-level barcodes provide an additional deterrent to counter-
feiters attempting to introduce false drugs into legitimate distribution.
Both RFID and barcode technologies will likely have a role in e-
pedigrees since both can enhance drug distribution security and reduce
the inefficiencies associated with sole reliance on paper forms." 6 The
widespread availability of barcodes also means that there is a compre-
hensive approach to drug tracking immediately available. It appears that
barcodes will be widely used to authenticate all drug products while
RFID use is limited, at present, to highly counterfeited drugs. Interest-
ingly, RFID and barcode technology are interoperable: some RFID
113. 21 C.F.R. § 201.25 (2006); FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BAR CODE LABEL
REQUIREMENTS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 7 (2006), available at http://www.fda.govlcberl
gdlns/barcode.pdf [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY].
114. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 113 at 1.
115. FDA said that it would consider accommodating new technologies by April 2006,
but the Agency did not provide any new opinions or information on other technologies in its
October 2006 guidance. Id. at 6.
116. Olin Thompson, Mobile Computing, 77 FOOD ENGINEERING 135, 135 (2005) (dis-
cussing how RFID or barcodes increase efficiency over paper forms).
The R.EI.D. Act of 2006
vendors offer scanners that can read RFID tags as well as barcodes." 7
The technologies are not mutually exclusive, so wholesalers will be able
to authenticate either barcoded or RFID-tagged drug packages and pass
on the pedigree. It remains to be seen whether manufacturers will con-
tinue to use a hybrid RFID and barcode system to generate e-pedigrees,
or will move towards RFID as the sole e-pedigree solution. Though they
are less efficient to use, barcodes are cheaper than RFID and might make
sense to use on drugs that are of lower value or less frequently counter-
feit until RFID tags become more affordable. Furthermore, barcodes are
not precluded in the R.F.I.D. Act, since they can be considered a track
and trace technology that has an equivalent function to RFID. In light of
these e-pedigree options, Congress should enact the R.F.I.D. Act imme-
diately to require e-pedigrees from manufacturers and wholesalers
during drug distribution.
CONCLUSION
Counterfeit drugs are a health and safety threat to U.S. consumers.
Counterfeit operations place consumers at risk and fund terrorist organi-
zations. Congress and the FDA have an important interest in
safeguarding the U.S. drug supply, and this interest is thwarted by the
relative ease of importing counterfeit drugs into the country. In light of
this, the safety of the drug supply can only be guaranteed by comprehen-
sively securing domestic drug distribution routes, but the attempts of
Congress and the FDA to do this have so far proved inadequate. The
PDMA is insufficient in securing drug supply chains because it does not
require all drug wholesalers to maintain effective and tamper-proof pedi-
grees, and a recent court decision has hampered the FDA's ability to
enforce the PDMA pedigree provisions in a discriminatory fashion
against only some distributors.
Congress needs to amend the PDMA or enact the R.F.I.D. Act to re-
quire e-pedigrees from all manufacturers and distributors. Though the
R.F.I.D. Act alone cannot eliminate the problem of counterfeit drugs in
the United States, the Act offers many benefits over the current PDMA.
It addresses the problem of counterfeit drugs in a comprehensive and
multi-faceted way and significantly decreases the likelihood that coun-
terfeit drugs will enter legitimate drug distribution routes. Congress
should not forestall mandating e-pedigrees: e-pedigree technology, in the
form of RFID or barcodes, is immediately available for use. In fact, the
FDA already mandates barcodes for other uses, and when barcodes are
117. Witt, supra note 111.
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used in conjunction with paper tracking, they can provide a stronger de-
fense to counterfeiters than paper pedigrees alone. RFID is a newer
technology that offers added benefits over barcodes, and the industry
should continue to move towards broader RFID adoption. RFID costs
are decreasing, and privacy concerns with RFID can be readily ad-
dressed through the R.F.I.D. Act, making RFID a feasible e-pedigree
solution for manufacturers and wholesalers.
